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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-RESTORING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FORMULA TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT
PROCESS: TAKING THE VICE OUT OF "ADVICE AND CONSENT"
I. INTRODUCTION
The first question a potential federal court nominee answers has almost
nothing to do with jurisprudence, political ideology, or even constitutional
law. The unspoken first question the candidate answers is "are you willing
to submit yourself and those in your life to the harsh appointment process
with no guarantee that you will ever receive a confirmation vote by the full
Senate?" After two years of answering yes to that question, Miguel Estrada
changed his answer to no.'
In early September 2003, after over two years of partisan controversy,
Miguel Estrada withdrew his name from consideration for the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.2 Estrada's withdrawal fol-
lowed the seventh failed attempt by Republican supporters to break a fili-
buster preventing a full Senate confirmation vote.3 With the increasing
prevalence of filibusters, anonymous holds, and other stalling tactics,
Estrada is not the only appellate court nominee in recent years to endure
excessive delay in the appointment process.4 Senate Democrats have re-
cently filibustered Texas Supreme Court Justice Priscilla Owen and Ala-
bama Attorney General William Pryor, both appellate court nominees, in
efforts to block their appointments.5
Although political leaders from both parties are quick to blame their
adversaries, stalling tactics have no party affiliation, as evidenced by the
current Democrat filibusters as well as the Republican slowdown of Democ-
rat nominations during President William J. Clinton's administration.6
Judge Richard Paez saw his confirmation to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit delayed over 1,500 days after President Clinton
nominated him in 1996. 7 In a 1997 National Public Radio broadcast, White
1. Helen Dewar, Estrada Abandons Court Bid, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Joan Biskupic, Embattled Judicial Candidate Withdraws Name, USA TODAY, Sept.
5, 2003, at A5.
5. Id.
6. Sarah Wilson, Appellate Judicial Appointments During the Clinton Presidency: An
Inside Perspective, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 29, 47 (2003) (calling the delays of Clinton
appointees "unprecedented").
7. Charlie Gonzales & Ruben Navarette, Jr., Editorial, Judicial Gridlock: Should Mi-
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House aides were quoted as saying "14 judicial nominees have been before
the Senate at least 18 months ... without being brought to a vote."8 Stall
tactics by both parties prompted admonishments by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist in year-end reports in both 1997 and 2001. 9 The Chief Justice
noted slowdowns by both the Republican controlled Senate in 1997 and the
Democratic run Senate in 2001.10 Rehnquist stated that the "Senate ought to
act with reasonable promptness and to vote each nominee up or down."' 1
Stall tactics normally reserved for federal appellate court nominees are
even trickling down to the district court level. 12 The waiting period for Ar-
kansas attorney Leon Holmes, who was nominated January 29, 2003 and
confirmed on July 6, 2004,13 for the Eastern District of Arkansas, was over
seventeen months from the time the Senate Judiciary Committee forwarded
his nomination to the full Senate. 14 While such waiting periods are standard
for appellate court nominees subjected to higher scrutiny, reporter Kevin
Freking points out that "the longest any other district judge has had to wait
this year was three weeks."' 15
The Holmes nomination serves as a useful study of just how politically
convoluted and inefficient the federal judicial appointment process has be-
come. Despite home-state backing, 16 including support by Arkansas's De-
mocratic senators, 17 Holmes met strong ideological opposition from national
special interest groups who questioned his willingness to follow the law
when ruling on abortion.' 8 Adherence to established law and ideological
guel Estrada's Stalled Nomination Lead to Reform? No or Yes, HISPANIC, Sept. 1, 2003, at
98. Paez endured renomination in 1997 and in 1999 before his eventual confirmation in 2000
by a vote of fifty-nine to thirty-nine; see Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing
up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228, 235-36 (2001).
8. Morning Edition: Federal Judge Shortage (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 22, 1997).




12. Kevin Freking, Holmes' Judge Nomination Stuck as Parties Debate Why, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 26, 2003, at A3.
13. See Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm (listing current judicial vacancies,
nominees, and dates of nomination) (last visited July 19, 2004).
14. Freking, supra note 12, at A3. Part of the delay is attributable to the unusual way in
which the Senate Judiciary Committee chose to forward Holmes's nomination to the full
Senate. Id. Holmes is the first judicial nomination since 1951 to be forwarded to the Senate
floor without a favorable recommendation. Id.
15. Id.
16. SaNta Chourey, The Hill: Centrist Republicans Raising Concerns About Writings by
District Court Nominee J Leon Holmes, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 1, 2003, available at 2003
WL 64748044.
17. Id. These senators are Blanche Lincoln and Mark Pryor. Id.
18. Id. Opponents of the nominee also cite excerpts from a 1997 article Holmes co-
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considerations are valid parts of the appointment process;1 9 consequently,
the Constitution provides appropriate executive and senatorial balancing
checks that offer opportunities to explore these concerns.
This note examines the political nature of the federal judicial appoint-
ment process beginning with a historical foundation of the appointment
process and brief identification of the major players involved.20 Next, the
note looks at recent trends that have exacerbated the inherent political na-
ture of the process 2' and makes a few suggestions for procedural reforms
that might help diminish some of the more unhelpful politicizing aspects
brought on by recent trends.
II. BACKGROUND
The words Publilius Syrus offered in the first century B.C., "[m]any
receive advice, few profit by it"'23 still ring true today in the context of the
judicial appointment process. The relatively straightforward foundation for
judicial appointment found in Article II of the United States Constitution
provides for executive power to nominate and senatorial control over con-
firmatior.24 But the full measure of the "advice" portion of the senatorial
power to give "advice and consent" is still subject to debate. 25 Additionally,
the Constitution is silent about other sources of advice the Chief Executive
may enlist in making appointment nominations.26 The following sections of
this note identify some of the major players in the confirmation process and
provide a historical context for the procedural modifications proposed later
in the note. The first section focuses on the constitutional framework for the
appointment process. The second section discusses the designated roles of
the President and the Senate with an overview of some ancillary players in
authored with his wife for a religious magazine in which Holmes quoted scripture stating a
wife is to be submissive to her husband. Editorials, On Judging Judges: Familiarity Breeds
Respect, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Aug. 7, 2003, at B 18.
19. See Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics
of Lower Federal Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 695, 718 (2003)
(arguing ideological debate over nominees is healthy for democracy).
20. See infra Part II.A-C.
21. See infra Part II.D.
22. See infra Part III.
23. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 99 (Justin Kaplan ed., Little, Brown, & Co.
16th ed. 1992) (1882).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; infra Part II.A (describing the Constitutional frame-
work)..
25. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS 135 (2000) (noting a
long-running disagreement among commentators over the Senate's role).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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the process. The third section gives a brief historical synopsis of the past
27half-century of the appointments process.
A. The Constitutional Framework: A Sketch Rather Than a Picture
Article II of the Constitution provides a foundation for the appoint-
ments process, stating the President "shall nominate, and by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other officers of the United States. 2 8 Most remarkable about
the Appointment Clause and the Constitution's general treatment of the
judicial branch is the lack of guidance regarding the structure and substance
of the judicial branch. 29 The judicial branch received little attention at the
constitutional convention, prompting Senator Paul Simon to quip that the
framers "spent more time on what the pay should be for [the other] two
branches than was spent in toto discussing the judicial branch., 30 The lim-
ited time spent formulating the judicial branch focused on the allocation of
the power of judicial appointment and the comparative merits of granting
authority in either the executive branch or the legislative branch.3'
Although there was little argument during the constitutional conven-
tion over judicial tenure and the need for appointment rather than election,3 2
the appointment clause generated considerable debate over the balancing of
confirmation power between the Senate and the President.3 3 The competing
theories were vesting appointment power solely in either the executive
branch or legislative branch or delegating part of the process to each of the
two branches.34 George Mason of Virginia and John Rutledge of South
Carolina represented a faction that sought to limit executive power by grant-
ing the legislature appointment autonomy.35 The Virginia Plan echoed this
philosophy and met with wide opposition by Federalists, such as Alexander
Hamilton and James Wilson, who advocated a strong executive branch.3 6
Hamilton's faction was concerned that placing the appointment power
27. Borrowing the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes from another context:
"Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eis-
ner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
29. See SENATOR PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT 151 (1992).
30. Id.
31. CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT
OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 9 (1997).
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id. at 9.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 11 (discussing Hamilton's support of limited executive power); see
GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 21 (naming Wilson as a supporter of limited executive power).
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solely with Congress would foster excessive dependency of the nation's
principal officers37 on the Congress that ruled over appointments. 38 Propo-
nents of executive autonomy also feared that unchecked congressional
power of appointment would overly politicize the appointment process. 39 As
Wilson explained, "[e]xperience sh[o]wed the impropriety of such appoint-
ments by numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the
necessary consequences. A principal reason for unity in the Executive was
the officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person., 40 In oppo-
sition to these beliefs, supporters of senatorial appointment proclaimed the
Senate as, in the words of James Madison, "sufficiently stable and inde-
pendent" to make "deliberate judgments. '41 John Rutledge offered a similar
opinion stating that he "was by no means disposed to grant [such] a power
to any single person. ' 42
After considerable posturing by both sides, the resulting compromise
43
vested the power of nomination with the Chief Executive, checked by the
"advice and consent" of the Senate. 44 Hamilton's Federalist Papers eluci-
date the rationale behind the compromise, stating that "one man of discern-
ment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to
particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior
discernment., 45 Hamilton continued:
[T]he necessity of [the Senate's] concurment would have a powerful,
though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check
upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to
prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from
family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popular-
ity.
4 6
37. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 9. Offices encompassed by the appointment
clause include, inter alia, ambassadors, Supreme Court justices, federal judges, and presiden-
tial cabinet members. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
38. SHELDON& MAULE, supra note 31, at 9.
39. Seeid. at ll.
40. MICHAEL GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 21 (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)).
41. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 5 (1997) (quoting THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
42. Id.
43. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 30-31 (1988).
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.




B. Major Players in the Appointment Process
Despite requiring participation among political leaders, the Constitu-
tion's structure of the appointment process invites conflict from the major
participants.47 Within this structure, each of the actors has assigned duties
and implicit limits on these duties designed to facilitate constructive debate
and prevent overreaching by either involved branch of government. 48 The
framers allocated authority over judicial appointments so that, in the words
of James Madison, "[a]mbition ... be made to counteract ambition. '49 This
section discusses the duties and powers of the major actors in the appoint-
ment process. First, this section explores the President's power to nomi-
nate. o The section continues by discussing the Senate's prerogative to pro-
vide "advice and consent" including examining some of the mechanisms
and institutional norms that the Senate uses to perform this duty.51
1. The Presidential Role in the Appointment Process
The presidential role in the appointment process begins with the power
of nomination expressly granted by Article II of the Constitution.52 This
nomination is not only the beginning of the appointment process but also
the culmination of a lengthy procedure of its own. 53 Prior to making a for-
mal judicial nomination, the President receives input from a variety of
sources, including White House general staff such as the Committee on
Judicial Selection and the Attorney General as well as other members of the
Department of Justice.54 The role of advisors and other outside sources in
counseling the President on nominees has increased exponentially, enjoying
great expansion during the Carter administration. 55 President James Carter
increased the role of advisors in an effort to bring more racial and gender
47. Michael Gerhardt, Federal Judicial Selection as War, Part Three: The Role of Ide-
ology, 15 REGENT U. L. REv. 15, 16-17 (2003) (evaluating the role ideological concerns play
in the confirmation process).
48. See id. at 17.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
50. See infra Part II.B. 1.
51. See infra Part II.B.2.
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
53. See SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 3 1, at 150.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 151. Carter's remarkable record of appointing close to 300 federal judges was
diminished only slightly by the absence of a Supreme Court appointment. HENRY J.
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 280 (1999). Congress's enactment of the
Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 created 152 Carter appointed judicial positions, placing
Carter in the top five in total number of judicial appointments, surpassed only by presidents
who served more than one term. Id. Despite serving only one term, Carter left the office of
the presidency having appointed 40.2% of the federal judiciary. Id.
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diversity to the federal judiciary.56 Changes implemented by Carter included
the creation of the United States Circuit Judge Nomination Commission to
help identify and promote qualified minority candidates.57 Carter's nominat-
ing commissions met wide criticism, mainly because they were seen as "far
from bipartisan-an estimated eighty-five percent of their members were
active Democrats-and that they did not eliminate politics or establish
'true' merit selections."58 Political historians Robert Carp and Ronald Stid-
ham belie Carter's professed goal of "representativeness" noting that "it is
clear that [Carter's] judges were selected with a keen eye toward their lib-
eral voting tendencies., 59 Subsequent presidents followed Carter's lead in
enrolling advisors and political allies to generate lists of potential nomi-
nees.
60
President Ronald Reagan also enlisted numerous sources of advice to
promote his judicial appointment agenda, including a nine member Presi-
dent's Committee on Federal Judicial Selection, established to replace
Carter's United States Circuit Judge Nomination Commission.61 The agenda
for Reagan's Committee differed, however, from Carter's commission in
that Reagan acknowledged the ideology of the judges as the primary subject
62of committee scrutiny. In a 1986 memorandum to then Attorney General
Edwin Meese, Assistant Attorney General Stephen Markman stated, "This
administration has in place what is probably the most thorough and compre-
hensive system for recruiting and screening federal judicial candidates of
any administration ever."63 To further clarify, Markman added, "This ad-
ministration has, moreover, attempted to assert the President's prerogatives
over judicial selection more consistently than many of its predecessors."
64
Advisory committees tailored to the goals of the presidential admini-
stration would be employed by the next two occupants of the White House.
President George H. W. Bush inherited much of Reagan's appointment in-
frastructure65 including the systematic screening of prospective lower court
56, ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 280.
57, Id. Carter defined his overriding goal in federal judicial appointments as a "per-
ceived political obligation of 'representativeness' based on race and gender." Id. As such, he
did more than any preceding president to nominate nontraditional candidates for the federal
bench. Id.
58. O'BRIEN, supra note 43, at 59.
59. ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 242 (1998).
60. See infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
61. HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS 60-61 (1988).
62. Id.
63. O'BRIEN, supra note 43, at 60-61 (quoting Memorandum from Stephen Markman to
Attorney General Edwin Meese (Sept. 8, 1986)).
64. Id.
65. Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74
JUDICATURE 294, 295 (1991). In addition to the basic procedural structure, Bush also inher-
ited Reagan-appointed Attorney General Dick Thornburgh. Id. The retention of Thornburgh,
2004]
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nominees. 66 Professor Sheldon Goldman has characterized President Bush's
judicial appointment process as "carrying on a tradition" established by
Reagan and Nixon.67 Subsequently, President William J. Clinton dismantled
this structure and replaced it with advisory mechanisms similar to those
Carter had employed. 8 Clinton, like his Democratic predecessor Carter,
professed increasing diversity in the federal judiciary as his judicial ap-
pointment agenda69 and encouraged senators to reinstitute district court
nominating commissions to encourage female and minority nominations.70
2. The Role of the Senate in the Appointment Process
The Appointment Clause provides that the President shall appoint, "by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 71 In efforts to develop and
expand the senatorial role of advising, the Senate has developed a number
of tools to influence presidential nominations. 72 Chief among these are sena-
torial courtesy, filibuster, indefinite senatorial holds on nominees, informal
private meetings between senators and nominees, public confirmation hear-
ings, and creation of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 73 While an explora-
tion of all the tools is beyond the scope of this note, some of the tools that
have gained greater prominence in recent years are potential subjects of
reform and need contextual background. The following section begins by
examining senatorial courtesy and then concludes with a brief overview of
the appointment role played by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
a. The rise of senatorial courtesy
The seed for senatorial courtesy 74 was planted during Washington's
presidency and has continued to grow relatively unchecked since sprouting
who was instrumental under Reagan in the appointment process, sent a message that Bush
intended to follow Reagan's approach to judicial appointments. Id at 305-06.
66. Id. at 295.
67. Id. In fact, nine of the first ten Bush appointments to federal appellate courts were
elevations of district court judges appointed by Reagan. Id. at 306.
68. See John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Appointment Proc-
ess Under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 15 (2003).
69. Id.
70. Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton Administration's End, 19 LAW &
INEQ. 159, 162 (2001).
71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
72. See infra Parts II.B.2.a-b.
73. See Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing
"Despise and Resent " with "Advice and Consent," 53 ADMrN. L. REv 1, 14-25 (2001).




during the first session of Congress.75 During the first Congress, both Geor-
gia senators opposed President Washington's nomination of Benjamin
Fishbourn as a naval officer in the Port of Savannah.76 When Washington
realized the full Senate would support the Georgia senators and deny con-
firmation of Fishbourne despite his uncontested qualifications, Washington
withdrew Fishbourne's nomination and successfully nominated someone
more favored by the two senators.77
This showing of unity among senators heightened presidential consid-
eration of home state senatorial approval and would eventually lead to the
modem practice of "blue slips. '78 Upon receiving the President's nominee
for district court, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee sends a blue
piece of paper to each of the senators from the state in which the district
court is located.79 A single negative blue slip results in the committee chair
tabling the nomination rather than allowing the nomination to proceed to a
full Senate vote likely to fail.80
The blue slip procedure for circuit court nominations differs because
the court presides over several states.8 ' Circuit court seats are traditionally
earmarked for representatives from particular states within the circuit 82 and
are usually treated as belonging to that state. 83 Despite this general treat-
ment, the role of senatorial courtesy in circuit court nominations is consid-
erably smaller than the "prime" role senatorial courtesy plays in district
court recruitment.84
Senatorial courtesy originated with the Senate's realization that a
united front would be the most effective means of asserting the power of
Traditionally, the term senatorial courtesy has referred to the deference the
president owes to the recommendations of senators from his own political party
on the particular people whom he should nominate to federal offices in the sena-
tors' respective states. A second form of senatorial courtesy is the deference a
member of Congress, particularly a senator, expects to get from his or her Senate
colleagues ... with respect to his or her own nomination to a confirmable post.
Id. Other scholars acknowledge that senatorial courtesy applies to senators from op-
posing political parties. See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal
Judiciary, 44 Am. U. L. REV. 699, 735 (1995) (examining the roles of senatorial pa-
tronage and senatorial courtesy in judicial appointments); see also Gerald N.
Rosenberg, Incentives, Reputation, and the Glorious Determinants of Judicial Behav-
ior, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 637, 643 (2000).
75. SHELDON AND MAULE, supra note 31, at 158.
76. ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 19.
77. Id.
78. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 159.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 158-59.
82. Rosenberg, supra note 74, at 643.
83. LAURENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 102 (2001).
84. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 158.
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confirmation." Historians Charles Sheldon and Linda Maule note, "[e]ven
though Senators might not personally dislike the President's choice, they
recognized that at a later time they might need the help of their colleagues
in similar circumstances. 86 By forsaking their own evaluation of the nomi-
nation and deferring to the negative blue slip from the home-state senator,
the Senate has effectively placed the power of confirmation assigned to the
entire senatorial body in the hands of either of the two home-state sena-
tors.8 7
Presidents have shown varying levels of deference to senatorial cour-
tesy in district court appointments.8 8 President Warren Harding used federal
appointments, including judicial appointments, to reward those that helped
him in his hard-fought battle to earn the Republican nomination in 1920.89
When it came to federal appointments within individual states, however,
President Harding gave substantial deference to Republican home-state
senators.9° In contrast, President Teddy Roosevelt acquiesced to the nomi-
nation suggestions of home-state senators only if he found the nominees met
his own professional and ideological standards for the office.91
More recently, Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan requested
that home-state senators send a recommendation list of three to five names
for consideration as nominees to fill a district court vacancy. 92 The recom-
mendation process promotes Senate involvement at the front-end of the
process and allows for more overall involvement among state actors.93 The
increased involvement on the front-end of the process facilitates easier con-
firmation of those nominees that survive initial senatorial courtesy by build-
ing support for the nominees and encouraging nomination of moderate can-
didates.94
Although primarily a tool for the consideration of nominations of dis-
trict judges,95 the practice of senatorial courtesy accounts, at least partially,
for the rejection of several nominations to the Supreme Court.96 One histori-
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See O'BRIEN, supra note 43, at 71.




92. O'BRIEN, supra note 43, at 70.
93. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 159.
94. Brannon P. Denning, The "Blue Slip": Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confir-
mation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 82 (2001).
95. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 158.
96. ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 19. [Senatorial courtesy] appears to have been the sole
factor in Grover Cleveland's unsuccessful nominations of William B. Homblower (1893)
and Wheeler H. Peckham (1894), both of New York; the senate successfully rejected them
by votes of 24:30 and 32:41, respectively. Id. In each instance David B. Hill (D.-N.Y.) in-
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cal justification offered for senatorial courtesy is that same-state senators
are likely more familiar with nominees from their own state and in a better
position to evaluate such nominees.97 Proponents also defend senatorial
courtesy as a means of sanction by the Senate that encourages the President
to consult with the Senate prior to making a nomination.98
b. The Senate Judiciary Committee
The eighteen-member Judiciary Committee performs several crucial
functions within the Senate's "advice and consent" authority.99 Some of the
more noteworthy functions are conducting hearings on the nominee and
deciding to recommend or withhold recommendation of a full Senate con-
firmation vote.100 Membership on the committee usually reflects the propor-
tional make-up of the Senate with the majority party assigning the chairper-
son.101 The Senate Judiciary Committee wields considerable power by de-
termining when the nomination will receive a confirmation vote from the
full Senate.'0 2
The committee chairperson possesses great influence over the confir-
mation process through his prerogative not only to set dates for hearings but
also to oversee the hearings themselves.10 3 David O'Brien summarized the
committee chairperson's influence stating, "[t]he approach of the chairman
of the Judiciary Committee toward judicial nominees determines, to a large
extent, whether the Senate exercises its check on the [P]resident's choices
for the federal bench."' ° History supports O'Brien's assertion, especially
during times the chairperson enjoys great political clout, such as the chair-
manships of James Eastland, Edward Kennedy, and Joseph Biden.
0 5
voked senatorial courtesy; Cleveland had snubbed Hill in his quest for a replacement for the
seat vacated by Justice Samuel Blatchford of New York. Id. Cleveland then had his revenge
when he refused to name a third New Yorker to the vacancy-instead, he turned to the De-
mocratic majority leader in the Senate, Edward D. White of Louisiana. Id.
97. Denning, supra note 94, at 82.
98. Id. at 90.
99. See SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 156-58.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 156.
102. O'BRIEN, supra note 43, at 72.
103. Id. O'Brien also notes that delay of Senate action on confirmation might be used,
inter alia, to pressure the President or to test the presidential and senatorial support of the
nominee. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Eastland chaired the committee from 1956 to 1979 "maintain[ing] almost com-
plete control over appointments." Id. Kennedy succeeded Eastland and made radical changes
such as a restructuring of blue slips so that silence would now equal consent, conducting
greater independent investigation of the nominees, and instituting a Judiciary Committee
questionnaire. Id. Biden presided over the contentious Bork nomination hearings. SHELDON
2004]
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The Judiciary Committee does not begin formal consideration of a
candidate until the President has officially named a nominee.106 The Com-
mittee may initiate an independent investigation of the candidate, although
the chairperson will already have received the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) report'07 on the nominee and will receive the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) committee's report and recommendation.'0 8 Based on these
findings, the Committee decides whether and when to schedule hearings for
the nominee. 10 9 These hearings allow senators to question nominees regard-
ing the qualifications and general judicial philosophy of the nominee and
also provide a forum for public scrutiny of the nominee."10 After any hear-
ings, the Judiciary Committee takes a vote to determine if the nomination
will be forwarded to the full Senate."'
C. Outside Players in the Appointment Process
1. The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary
Although the ABA has taken an interest in the appointment process
since the organization's founding in 1878,112 the ABA's involvement in the
judicial process was limited until 1948 when the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee requested a formal opinion on every judicial nomination."13 Four years
after the Senate Judiciary Committee's request, President Harry S. Truman
requested the same opinions, a procedural norm followed by subsequent
presidents until President George W. Bush's determination in 2001 that the
President no longer required the ABA rating prior to official nomination."
4
The Senate Judiciary Committee requested that the ABA continue its ratings
& MAULE, supra note 31, at 73.
106. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 156.
107. Id. The FBI gathers information about the nominee without evaluating or recom-
mending the nominee. Id. The purpose of this report is to check on the candidate's personal
credibility. Id. During the nomination of Clarence Thomas, Anita Hill's allegations of sexual
harassment originally surfaced in the FBI report, although the allegation would be down-
played until public scrutiny required further investigation. GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 249.
108. See infra Part II.
109. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 157.
110. See id. at 157-58. Sheldon and Maule contend that these open hearings instill a
"modicum of accountability" in the nominee. Id. at 158.
111. Id. at 156-59.
112. See EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS
WORK, 3-12 (1953) (discussing the circumstances and goals surrounding the founding of the
ABA).
113. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 153.
114. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 1 n. 1 (2002).
[Vol. 26
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
despite the change in executive policy, and the ABA complied." 15 Although
no longer done before the President makes the nomination, the ABA has
continued to evaluate and rate nominees, utilizing essentially the same crite-
ria and procedures developed over the past fifty years. 16 Because the inves-
tigation of circuit and district court candidates differs significantly from the
more intensive investigation and rating of Supreme Court nominees, both
processes demand brief examination.' 
17
a. ABA evaluation of lower court nominees
The evaluation process for lower court nominees begins when the fif-
teen-member Standing Committee receives the name of the nominee from
the Attorney General." 8 The Standing Committee typically assigns the in-
vestigation to the Standing Committee member who represents the region
housing the judicial vacancy." 9 The investigation includes an examination
of the legal writing of the nominee, the completion of the Justice Depart-
ment's "Personal Data Questionnaire," and extensive interviews of ac-
quaintances and associates of the nominee that might provide insight into
the integrity, competence, and judicial temperament of the nominee. 20 The
investigating committee member then meets with the nominee to discuss
and to address any areas of concern resulting from the interviews or ques-
tionnaire121 If the investigating committee member recommends the nomi-
nee as "qualified," an informal report is drafted for the chair of the Standing
Committee. 22 A determination by the committee member that the nominee
is "not qualified" results in another committee member repeating the inves-
tigation to help ensure an unbiased rating. 
1 3
b. ABA evaluation of Supreme Court nominees
The ABA employs the same general evaluation process for Supreme
Court nominees but on a much larger and more intensive scale.124 Because
all members of the Standing Committee participate in the investigation and
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 153.
118. Id. Because of the 2001 change in executive policy, this process takes place after the
nominee has already survived pre-nomination senatorial courtesy as well as Justice Depart-
ment screening. See AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, supra note 114, at 1 n. 1.
119. SHELDON & MAULE. supra note 31, at 153.
120. Id. at 153-54.






interviews are conducted nationwide, evaluation of Supreme Court nomi-
nees can take considerably longer than for the lower courts.1 25 Members of
the legal education community and former Supreme Court clerks help re-
view the nominee's written work. 26 The process results in a rating of either
"well qualified," "qualified," or "not qualified" from each committee mem-
ber.127 The full committee report on a Supreme Court nominee includes a
separate rating from each committee member. 
28
2. Special Interest Group Influence on Judicial Appointments
The recent heightened scrutiny of the appointment process can be
traced to the influx of interest generated in judicial appointments following
federal decisions on polarizing issues such as race and abortion. 29 Judge
Simon H. Rifkind describes federal courts as "the problem solvers of our
society: Shall we prosecute a war, or make peace? What is life; when does
death begin? How should we operate prisons and hospitals? No problem
seems to go beyond the desire of the American people to entrust to the
courts."'130 The historical and quite logical progeny of the Supreme Court's
increasing role as "social engineer" has increased emphasis on evaluation of
the political ideologies of the justices.' 31 If, as some constitutional scholars
theorize, the judicial branch assumes the policy-determining role of societal
"problem-solver,"'' 32 the public interest in determining the judicial philoso-
phies of the justices becomes as significant as determining the philosophies
of the legislative officials elected to establish policy. 1
33
125. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 114, at 9.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 10. The ABA currently uses three ratings. Id. The ABA abandoned a fourth
rating of "exceptionally well qualified" during George H.W. Bush's term. Laura E. Little,
The ABA 's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are We Ready To Give Up on
the Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 37,41 n.19 (2001).
128. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 114, at 9.
129. See William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for Syn-
thesis, 57 ALB. L. REv. 993, 995 (1994).
130. Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Role of the Courts in Contemporary Society, in JUDGES ON
JUDGING 284 (David M. O'Brien ed., 1997) (quoting Simon H. Ritkind, Address to the Na-
tional Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
in St. Paul, Minn. (April 8, 1976).
131. See Stephen L. Carter, Why the Confirmation Process Can't Be Fixed, 1993 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1, 6 (1993).
132. Aldisert, supra note 130, at 284.
133. See generally John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and




Special interest group involvement in the appointment process has sig-
nificantly increased since the 1970s, 134 leading Professor William Ross to
note that organized interest groups "have become a permanent and promi-
nent feature in the federal selection process.' 35 Special interest groups did
not play a substantial role in the appointment process during the early years
of the republic largely because of the original understanding of the Supreme
Court and the nature of the first special interest groups. 36 The Supreme
Court was seen by some founders as the weakest of the three branches,
37
and the first politically active special interest groups tended to be economi-
cally centered and uninvolved in the make-up of the judiciary.3
Effective special interest group participation in federal appointments
dates to the 1881 opposition to Rutherford B. Hayes's nomination of
Stanley Matthews.' 39 Populist groups representing farmers, such as the Na-
tional Grange, 140 waged a successful lobby effort against Matthews because
of his extensive ties to big business interests. ' 4' Despite the lobbying efforts,
President James Garfield, Hayes's successor, renominated Matthews. 142 The
renomination prompted a lobbying response by individuals and groups with
big business interests, culminating in Matthews's successful, though tumul-
tuous, confirmation later that same year. 143
Special interest group involvement reached a new high during the 1916
confirmation contest over Supreme Court nominee Louis Brandeis.' 44 Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson's nomination of Brandeis met ideological opposition
from groups representing big business interests and the current and several
past presidents of the ABA. 45 Although the lobbying groups generally
based opposition on Brandeis's supposed radical social and economic
views, many also questioned his character; sometimes these lobbying
groups "openly exhibited anti-Semitism.'
' 46
134. Ross, supra note 129, at 1022-23.
135. Id. at 1023.
136. See GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 69-72.
137. SIMON, supra note 29, at 149.
138. See GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 69-72.
139. Id. at 69.
140. The oldest national agricultural organization in the nation, the National Grange
formed in the years following the Civil War to "unite private citizens in improving the eco-
nomic and social position of the nation's farm population." National Grange, The National
Grange: 137 Years of Service to Rural America! at
http://www.nationalgrange.org/about/history.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
141. GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 69-72.
142. Id.
143. Id. For a more detailed account of Matthews's nominations and appointment, see
ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 102-04.
144. Gerhardt, supra note 25, at 69-70.
145. Id.
146. Id. The Senate eventually confirmed Brandeis, making him the first Jewish justice
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Today's special interest groups are not limited to economic agendas, as
such groups predominately were prior to the Brandeis era, but encompass
all sorts of political agendas.' 47 Modem special interest groups use a wide
arsenal of tactics in attempting to influence judicial appointments, including
campaign donations, lobbying, advertising, and media campaigns directed at
both the executive and legislative branches. 148 While the current emphasis
may be on shaping the direction of appointments, efforts are not only aimed
at trying to get the right person into the robe.
149
Additionally, special interest groups often win simply by playing the
game. As Michael Gerhardt points out, "It is also clear that many groups or
organizations use confirmation proceedings as events in which they will try
to focus on or bring attention to issues that are especially salient for their
members or major contributors."'' 50 In such cases, the value of the proceed-
ing is not necessarily the opportunity to influence the appointment but the
chance to use the forum for attention on the issue.
151
3. The Role of Procedural Norms in the Appointment Process
The appointment clause leaves considerable leniency in the exercise of
the nomination power.152 This leniency produces potential procedural dif-
ferences each presidential term in both the nomination and the confirmation
processes.153 Procedural variations occur because the President and the Sen-
ate are at liberty to agree on whatever procedures and requirements they see
fit, 154 but no means of enforcing such arrangements exists nor are such
agreements binding to subsequent actors in the confirmation process. 155
Despite the lack of enforcement mechanisms or binding precedent,
subsequent actors adopt many arrangements because the arrangements are
on the Supreme Court. ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 47.
[Brandeis's] daughter, Susan, heard the news [of his appointment] in New York
City from a woman seated next to her at a meeting, who commented: 'I hear
they confirmed that Jew Brandeis to the Supreme Court.' Susan responded
calmly: 'You are speaking to the right person. Mr. Brandeis happens to be my
father.'
Id. at 137. Brandeis became one of the most highly regarded justices in the history of
the Supreme Court. Id. at 6-7.
147. See GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 70.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 71.
151. Id. at 70-71.
152. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.





beneficial to one actor or the process as a whole.156 Professor Gerhardt,
among others, has referred to these unwritten arrangements as procedural
norms and detailed their impact on the appointment process., 57 Gerhardt
believes that political conflict over individual appointments frequently oc-
curs when either the Senate or the President chooses to ignore or attempts to
alter established norms. 158 Consequently, appointment reform needs to ade-
quately accommodate the norms that shape the process. 1
59
D. Recent Trends: The Confirmation Process Crawls into the Twenty-first
Century
In the years following Nixon's two failed Supreme Court nominees,
the country's infatuation with the political aspects of the appointment proc-
ess has continued to grow. 160 This unprecedented focus, along with in-
creased partisan involvement, has raised concerns among legal scholars that
the confirmation process is losing efficiency.' 6' In the eight years since
President Bill Clinton and the 104th Senate filled the last Supreme Court
vacancy by appointing Stephen Breyer, the nation has endured almost con-
tinuous divided government. 162 Confirmation slowdowns have always been
a foreseeable consequence of divided government.163 Professor Robert
Scigliano notes that Presidents enjoy only a forty-two percent success rate
for Supreme Court nominations when a President's party is in the minority
in the Senate as opposed to just over a ninety percent rate of success when
the same party controls the White House and the Senate.164 The drop in suc-
cess rate is less dramatic for lower court appointments as a result of greater
156. Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointment
Process, 50 DuKE L.J. 1687, 1687 (2001).
157. Id. Gerhardt defines norms as "the behavioral regularities of presidents and senators
regarding appointments that persist in the absence of formal rules and that deviations from
which trigger sanctions." Id.; see also Denning, supra note 73, at 14-25 (reviewing the rise
and fall of various norms applicable to federal appointments).
158. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 156.
159. See generally id.
160. Ross, supra note 129, at 1022-23. Nixon nominated Clement F. Haynsworth Jr. to
fill the Supreme Court vacancy created by the resignation of Justice Abe Fortas. See
ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 10-13. After the defeat of Haynsworth's nomination prompted
by questionable ethical decisions involving conflicts-of-interest, Nixon responded by nomi-
nating the even more controversial G. Harold Carswell. Id. at 10-11. The Senate also refused
to confirm Carswell. Id. at 12.
161. Maltese, supra note 68, at 3 (discussing the appointment slow-down and rise of
partisan conflict during the last eight years).
162. Id. at 2.
163. Seeid
164. Michael J. Gerhardt, Towards a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal Ap-
pointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 467, 522 (1998).
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deference to presidential nominees165 and the traditional input given to the
Senate on the front end of the process through senatorial courtesy.
1 66
The recent slowdown has been exacerbated by acrimonious debate
over public policy in highly divisive areas such as abortion and race.1 67 As
the federal courts increasingly attempt to resolve these issues through judi-
cial review, the political stakes go up over the judges and justices who make
these monumental decisions.
68
The landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education169 ignited height-
ened scrutiny of the Supreme Court's composition by demonstrating the
extent of the Court's power over public policy. 70 The decision would
prompt senators to begin more thorough questioning of nominees' judicial
philosophies in confirmation hearings. 171 In 1957, just three years after the
Court's ruling in Brown, Senator James Eastlands asked William Brennan,
"Do you think the Constitution of the United States could have one meaning
this week and another meaning next week?' ', 72 The questioning of judicial
philosophy became even more direct two years later during confirmation
hearings for Potter Stewart when Arkansas Senator John McClellan asked,
"Do you agree with the view, the reasoning and logic applied . . . and the
philosophy expressed by the Supreme Court in arriving in its decision in the
case of Brown v. Board of Education on May 17, 1954?'
173
165. See O'BRIEN, supra note 43, at 65-69. Another primary reason for greater success
among lower court nominees is the "rubber stamp" approach taken by the Senate prior to the
recent increased scrutiny of all federal judicial appointments. Id. This can be seen as either
greater deference towards the President's nomination or as senatorial apathy towards who
sits on the lower court bench. See id.
166. See supra notes 73-98 and accompanying text.
167. Maltese, supra note 68, at 6.
168. See Carter, supra note 131, at 12.
169. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
170. See SIMON, supra note 29, at 31.
171. Maltese, supra note 68, at 6.
172. Id. At the time, Eastland was the sitting Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Id. Brennan replied, "I think that puts it in rather a narrow compass, Senator. The application
of the Constitution is a problem of applying to living matter, cases that come before us."
Nomination of William Joseph Brennan, Jr. (Feb. 26-27, 1957), in 6 THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL
NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-75,
at 38 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1977).
173. Maltese, supra note 68, at 6. Stewart answered:
It is a question that I have never directly asked myself. I was a Circuit Judge, ex-
actly the same time as that particular decision was announced. And I understand
that you are not asking me for any indication how I would vote or decide cases
now before our court or coming before it.
Nomination of Potter Stewart to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States (April 9, 1959), in 6 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY
THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE., 1916-1975, at 34 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacob-
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Senators were not the only political leaders to recognize the increasing
importance of judicial appointments in the furtherance of political policy. In
a 1969 memorandum to President Richard Nixon, White House aide Tom
Charles Huston emphasized the value of judicial appointments, calling them
the "least considered aspect of Presidential power."'174 Huston elaborated:
In approaching the bench, it is necessary to remember that the decision
as to who will make the decisions affects what decisions will be made.
That is, the role the judiciary will play in different historical eras de-
pends as much on the type of men who become judges as it does on the
constitutional rules which appear to [guide them]. 1
75
Huston's letter prompted Nixon to develop a comprehensive strategy
for the appointment of judges that shared his political ideology.' 76 This tac-
tic marked a revival of the federal judiciary as presidential legacy by con-
tinuing to enact the political philosophy of a president long after his term
has ended. 177
Subsequent presidential administrations have recognized the potential
for policy reform through the judiciary and have consistently sought to use
the judiciary as an "instrument of power and a way to ensure a president's
legacy.' 78 During the Reagan presidency, Attorney General Edwin Meese
noted the administration may use selective judicial appointments to "institu-
tionalize the Reagan revolution so it can't be set aside no matter what hap-
pens in future presidential elections."' 179 Professor Sheldon Goldman con-
tends that the Reagan administration tactically appointed younger judges in
an attempt to extend Reagan's legacy. 180 Reagan's appointments, either
through direct design or as a result of the demographics of those who shared
his ideology, tended to be younger judges who had more potential years on
the bench ahead of them.' 81
Contrary to his Republican predecessors, President William J. Clinton
chose not to make federal judicial appointments a primary focus of his ad-
stein eds., 1977).
174. Maltese, supra note 68, at 3 (quoting Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston,
White House aide to President Richard Nixon, Memorandum for the President 1-2 (Mar. 25,
1969) (available at WHCF ExFG 50, the Judicial Branch (1969-1970), Box 1, White House
Central Files, FG 50, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, College Park, Md.)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. O'BRIEN, supra note 43, at 20-21.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 21-24 (quoting D. M. O'Brien, Meese's Agenda for Ensuring the Reagan
Legacy, L. A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1986, at 3).
180. GOLDMAN, supra note 41, at 337.
181. See O'BRIEN, supra note 43, at 64.
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ministration.8 2 Some historians argue that this was a conscious decision
made in an attempt by President Clinton to depoliticize the process by de-
creasing the presidential role.'83 Perhaps Clinton preferred to concentrate on
other matters of national interest he considered more compelling, for exam-
ple, health care and balancing the budget.
8 4
Regardless of motivation, less presidential involvement only facilitated
the Senate slowdown by exposing nominations to increased delay tactics.18 5
President Clinton's unwillingness to focus on judicial selection left Clinton
nominees vulnerable to attack by Republican opposition that was willing to
expend political capital on blocking appointments. 16 Many Republican
senators recognized Clinton's reluctance to fight for judicial appointments
and employed delay tactics to provoke public contests. 187 Clinton nomina-
tion insider Eleanor Dean Acheson summarized the Clinton administration's
distaste for judicial selection battles by stating, "There are a couple of cases
in which we decided that even if we thought we had a shot at winning a
fight ... that it was not worth the time and resources."'1
8 8
The limited judicial strategies adopted by the Clinton administration
proclaimed many of the same goals espoused by the Carter administra-
tion.189 Prime among these goals was the objective of creating a more de-
mographically representative judiciary. 190 Despite the diverse backgrounds
of Clinton appointees, Professor Theresa Beiner notes that the voting statis-
tics of these judges in cases involving issues relevant to women and minor-
ity group members demonstrate that Clinton appointees were "philosophi-
cally similar, and ultimately, quite moderate philosophically."' 91
Clinton's nomination agenda prompted one conservative public inter-
est group to respond with an assertion that Clinton's judicial legacy would
be an "out-of-control" judiciary prone to judicial activism. 192 Voting statis-
tics on Clinton's appointees belie this characterization, instead supporting
the assertion that Clinton largely appointed moderates. 93 The moderate
behavior and diverse characteristics of Clinton's appointees lend credence





187. Id. at 307.
188. CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 59, at 243-44.
189. See Maltese, supra note 68, at 15.
190. See id.
191. Theresa Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New
Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 608 (2003).
192. Maltese, supra note 68, at 15. The Judicial Selection Monitoring Project made this
assertion in a findraising letter signed by former Reagan nominee Robert Bork. Id.
193. CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 59, at 243.
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to Clinton's claim that diversity rather than ideology was the driving force
behind his appointment decisions.' 94 Regardless whether diversity was Clin-
ton's prime objective or simply concealed a more politically motivated
agenda, Clinton's appointments did increase diversity in the federal judici-
ary. 195
In 1997 the conflict intensified when political leaders began to ac-
knowledge conscious efforts to slowdown the confirmation of nominees.
196
In his 1997 year-end report to Congress on the federal judiciary, Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist expressed concern about "serious delays in the ap-
pointment process" that threatened the quality of the federal judiciary.'
97
Although the Chief Justice's reprimand temporarily quelled the judicial
slowdown, the stall tactics would return as the 2000 election approached.1
98
Some scholars, however, downplay the significance of the backlog just prior
to the 2000 election recognizing election year slowdowns as a regularly
occurring norm in the judicial appointment process. 199
The unusual circumstances surrounding President George W. Bush's
victory in the 2000200 election further complicated the judicial appointment
process by generating extensive controversy over potential judicial nomina-
tions, especially Supreme Court nominations, that Bush would make during
his term. 20' Constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman called for the Senate to
"refuse to confirm any [Supreme Court] nominations offered up by Presi-
dent Bush., 20 2 Some observers theorize that the debate surrounding recent
Bush nominees such as Estrada, Owen, and Holmes is intended to set the
stage for any potential Bush Supreme Court nomination.
20 3
194. Id.
195. Beiner, supra note 191, at 599-600. "The Clinton administration successfully ap-
pointed 51 women and 42 judges of color, for a total of 29% and 24%, respectively, of its
174 appointments." Id. at 601.
196. Maltese, supra note 68, at 17-18.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 18. Slowdowns in appointments typically occur around elections, when the
party in the minority has incentive to stall in hopes of winning a majority and gaining control
over nominations. See GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 301.
199. See GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 301.
200. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S 98 (2000) (ending, in a five-to-four decision, the re-
counting of Florida votes in the 2000 presidential election and guaranteeing George W. Bush
the presidency).
201. See Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself in THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Feb. 12,
2001) available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/3/ackerman-b.html (suggesting that
the Senate deny deferential treatment to Bush nominees for lower court bench and patently
withhold confirmation of any Supreme Court nominations).
202. Maltese, supra note 68, at 12 (quoting Bruce Ackerman).




Although scholars frequently argue that the appointment process
should be apolitical,20 4 this blanket criticism undervalues the historical real-
ity that the process is inherently political.0 5 Christopher L. Eisgruber notes
in his review of Michael Gerhardt's The Federal Appointments Process,
"Gerhardt reaches the same conclusion as other leading historians and po-
litical scientists: 'It is . . . beyond question that throughout U.S. history
presidents and senators have been concerned about the social or political
ramifications of judicial nominations.' 20 6 Eisgruber reiterates Gerhardt's
hypothesis that "the crucial question about the American appointments
process is not whether it should be political, but how it should be politi-
cal. 207 As Gerhardt states, "Different solutions are required, depending on
the politics one would like to eradicate or reduce in the confirmation proc-
ess.
,2°8
This section begins by discussing the policy behind the constitutional
design of the appointment process followed by a brief examination of the
implications of the policy on reform. The section concludes by discussing
three suggestions for procedural reform that reflect the constitutional policy
concerns examined in the beginning of the section.
A. The Groundwork for Reform: Procedural Rather Than Structural
Political conflict is the natural consequence of an appointment process
that allocates power between two politically accountable actors: the Presi-
dent and the Senate. 20 9 Many constitutional scholars recognize that the
founders designed a process that included conflict in order to ensure appro-
priate consideration and evaluation of nominees. 210 The accountability of
the actors, the life tenure of the judges, and the polarizing nature of the is-
211
sues all support the need for deliberation and debate over nominees.
Although many commentators contend judicial philosophy and general
ideology should be included in presidential nomination of candidates as
204. GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 256.
205. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Politics and Personalities in the Federal Appointments
Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 177, 178 (2001).
206. Id at 178 (quoting GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 215). For a review of the political
science and history literature on the point, see TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A
POLITICAL COURT 85-93 (1999).
207. Eisgruber, supra note 205, at 177.
208. GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 256.
209. Id. at 258-59.
210. Little, supra note 127, at 49.
211. Eisgruber, supra note 205, at 179-80.
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well as in the Senate's advisory role of confirmation,21 2 the downside of
including ideology is the fueling of political rhetoric that is unhelpful in the
assessment of nominees.21 3 Record distortion is one detrimental norm that
has developed as a result of increased ideological scrutiny.21 4 Potential re-
form should aim not at the chilling of ideological and philosophical debate,
but at removing the more undesirable and unhelpful aspects of the process
such as partisan payback,21 5 personal bias,216 and record distortion in the
form of unusual or exaggerated claims about nominees.
217
If, as some constitutional scholars posit, the recent problems with the
judicial appointment process are a product of the procedural application of
the structure rather than the structure itself,218 then any potential reforms
should be aimed at curtailing the offensive actions instead of revamping the
structure of the process. 219 Gerhardt goes even further, contending that un-
der our present system of government radical structural change will remain
impossible without dramatic political changes beyond just the judicial as-
pects of the process.220 If Gerhardt is correct, then efforts to reform the ap-
pointment process need to be procedural in nature and gradual in application
212. See id.
213. See Gerhardt, supra note 156, at 1706.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 156, at 1706-07 (discussing payback as a standard
practice in the appointment process). Gerhardt defines payback as the willingness for politi-
cal actors, such as senators, to oppose a nomination in retaliation for the prior contesting of
the leaders' preferred nominee. Id.
216. See, e.g., Eisgruber, supra note 205, at 183.
217. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 156, at 1707 (identifying media coverage as facilitat-
ing outlandish claims about nominees). President Clinton's nomination of Ronnie White to
become a federal district judge in Missouri illustrates the problems of both rhetoric and pay-
back. Id. at 1706. During White's hearings, White's Republican adversaries described him as
"pro-criminal" and having a "tremendous bent toward criminal activity." Id. at 1707. Repub-
licans hold no monopoly on exaggeration, though, as evidenced by the eloquent but arguably
overreaching "Robert Bork's America" speech delivered by Senator Edward Kennedy on the
Senate floor only forty-five minutes after the announcement of Bork's nomination in which
Kennedy exclaimed "Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced into
back alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue policemen could
break down citizen's doors in midnight raids, school children could not be taught about evo-
lution, writers and artists could be censured at the whim of government." ABRAHAM, supra
note 55, at 298 (citing ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA 98 (1989)).
218. See Ross, supra note 129, at 998 (discussing various subjects of potential reform).
Ross specifically notes, "The more unsavory aspects of recent confirmation struggles, par-
ticularly the distortions of Robert Bork's record, were the fault of individuals and organiza-
tions rather than the confirmation process itself." Id. at 998; see also Carter, supra note 131,
at 1 (arguing that "[t]here is nothing wrong with the confirmation process as such or, for that
matter, with the nomination process as such").
219. Ross, supra note 129, at 998.
220. GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 259.
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while retaining the President and the Senate as the key decision makers in
the appointment process. Additionally, reform suggestions that dramatically
alter the allocation of appointment power encounter practical difficulties in
enactment because, by redefining the role of our political leaders, these pro-
posals raise questions of constitutionality and potentially require constitu-
tional amendment.22'
Considering the improbability and undesirability of radical political re-
structuring, the best hopes for reform lie in procedural rather than structural
changes.222 Remedying the appointment process's departure from its "con-
stitutional roots" is one potential goal of procedural reform.223 In pursuit of
this end, proper reflection of the policy considerations implicit in the fram-
224ers' original structural formulation should be a primary requirement. The
founders recognized the political nature of the appointment process and
extensively debated the allocation of appointment power to properly address
the concerns accompanying the process. 225 Reform should accord with the
original goals envisioned by our nation's founders: goals still laudable today
such as judicial independence, efficiency, and minimization of unhelpful
political partisan bickering.226 Current norms should be evaluated to see if
they facilitate or hinder these underlying goals. The presidential prerogative
of nomination should be properly checked by the Senate's power of confir-
mation or denial.227 The exercise of the Senate's power to advise and con-
sent should be consistent with the designs of the founders and not serve as
either a usurpation of the presidential nomination power or a rubber stamp
endorsement of any candidate the President puts forward.228 The advice and
consent functions of the Senate should also comport with the founders' re-
quirement of only a simple majority to confirm.229
The following procedural changes could all operate in accordance with
the reformation concerns discussed above. While none of the proposed
changes represents the type of "radical reform" Professor Gerhardt ac-
knowledges as unlikely, each involves compromise designed to help the
process operate more efficiently. The difficulty in implementing the reforms
221. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 129, at 1039 (discussing the practical difficulties of en-
acting a two-thirds requirement for judicial appointments).
222. Id.
223. See Denning, supra note 73, at 3.
224. See W. William Hodes, The Overtly "Political" Character of the Advise and Con-
sent Function: Offsetting the Presidential Veto with Senatorial Rejection, 7 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 109, 114-15 (1991).
225. See supra Part II.A.
226. See supra Part II.A.
227. See generally Hodes, supra note 224.
228. See generally id.
229. See infra Part I11.B.
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manifests in persuading the political leaders responsible to relinquish con-
trol over particular aspects of the process.23°
B. Curtailing the Use of the Filibuster in Judicial Appointments: Choos-
ing Not To Decide
Democratic and Republican political leaders alike in recent years have
criticized the use of the filibuster as a means of blocking a full senate
vote.231 No other widely used tactic in the federal judicial appointment
process so arguably contravenes constitutional design.232 Although a major-
ity vote on federal judicial nominees is not expressly precluded by the Con-
stitution, treaty ratification and the overriding of presidential vetoes both
require a two-thirds Senate vote while no similar limits are placed on fed-
eral judicial appointments.233 Professor Ross notes that "the simple majority
requirement appears to have been contemplated by the framers and the plain
language of the constitution. 234 Senate procedural rules, however, allow
any individual senator to continue with a filibuster unless broken by a clo-
ture vote of at least sixty senators,235 nine more than the simple majority
needed to reach a final decision on a judicial nominee.236
Because withholding a vote yields the same outcome as voting the
nominee down,23 7 the nine vote discrepancy results in a de facto raising of
the senator count needed for confirmation from the simple majority to the
filibuster breaking total of sixty.238 Assuming the two hundred and fourteen
year history of a simple majority approval in judicial appointments has been
230. Gerhardt, supra note 156, at 1698.
231. For a Republican reprimand see "Letter from President George W. Bush to Senator
Bill Frist and Senator Tom Daschle, President Calls for Action on Judicial Nominations,"
(March 11, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030311-1.html. For a summary of
Democratic denouncements see Goldman, supra note 7, at 231-35.
232. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REv. 181,
185 (1997).
233. Ross, supra note 129, at 1039.
234. Id.
235. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 232, at 184. In 1908, Senator Robert M. LaFollete
lodged one of the most notorious filibusters in history. Id. at 196. LaFollete held the floor for
eighteen hours sustaining himself with eggnog and turkey sandwiches. Id. Unfortunately for
LaFollete, the eggnog was adulterated and made the Senator quite ill. Id. After buying some
time by forcing roll calls, LaFollete continued for another eight hours until Senator Gore,
who was blind, yielded the floor to a fellow senator who had just excused himself to the
cloakroom. Id.
236. The author's calculations assume a full vote by all 100 members of the Senate re-
quiring either a majority of fifty-one or fifty plus the vice president's vote.
237. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Politics and Personalities in the Federal Appointments
Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 177, 184 (2002).
238. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 232, at 215.
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a correct interpretation of Article II, the raising of the threshold seems un-
warranted. Filibustering results in the anomalous situation in which a deci-
sion to hold a vote on the nominee requires greater support from the Senate
than is needed to actually decide the fate of the nominee.
Proponents justify filibuster as an exercise of the senatorial power to
adopt procedural measures to facilitate the operation of the Senate. 239 Con-
gressman Charlie Gonzalez praises the filibuster as a "nonpartisan legisla-
tive tool that gives all senators the power to secure information, facilitate
negotiation, and seek compromise. ' '240 The problem with such a powerful
tool in the confirmation process, considering the simple majority needed to
confirm, is the dramatic shifting of the balance of power into the hands of a
minority of senators by requiring a three-fifths supermajority for Senate
action.24' In other senatorial processes, when compromise is more easily
accomplished through the alteration of the proposed legislation, the coali-
tion building function of the filibuster is easier to justify.
Although the Senate has developed a reputation as a deliberative legis-
lative body, some historical accounts dispute the widespread practice of
dilatory debate in the early days of the Senate.242 Fisk and Chemerinsky
note that while filibuster "seems to have occurred, the rules probably pro-
hibited it,"'243 and determine it unclear if dilatory debate was "considered an
established practice at this point" or just a distasteful habit of some Sena-
tors.24
In the context of judicial nominations, filibuster can rarely be charac-
terized as a tool for securing information because the senator filibustering
has frequently already adopted a firm position on the issue.245 The resolute
senator is then using the filibuster to gain bargaining strength rather than
information, as well as to demonstrate her resolve on the issue. This tactical
use of the filibuster undermines the responsibility that both the Senate and
the President have in expeditious selection of federal judges.246 Commenta-
239. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
240. Charlie Gonzalez, supra note 7, at A3.
241. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 232, at 215-17.
242. Id. at 188-90.
243. Id. In support of this assertion, Fisk and Chemerisky note that early Senates infor-
mally adopted Thomas Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Procedure, which specified:
"No one is to speak impertinently or beside the question, superfluously or tediously." Id.
244. Id. at 189. Senator (and former member of the House) John Randolph was so noted
for his loquaciousness that Thomas Jefferson adopted the term "a John Randolph" to de-
scribe one who rambles during a congressional proceeding. Id.
245. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 164, at 515 (noting Senator Jesse Helms's use of
delay tactics to oppose President Clinton's nomination of Walter Dellinger). Senator Helms
frequently employed filibuster to oppose Clinton nominees for ideological reasons. Id. The
Senator's opposition to Dellinger was primarily payback for Dellinger's role in bolstering the
Senate Judiciary Committee's opposition of Robert Bork in 1987. Id.
246. See Thomas 0. Sargentich, Report of the Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection
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tors have characterized the filibuster as a "minority veto, 247 having "little to
do with deliberation and less to do with debate. 248 Similarly, characterizing
the filibuster as a means of "facilitating negotiation" is misleading.249 Fili-
buster, like a minority veto or other strategies that dramatically shift power
to a minority, does not make negotiation easier; it makes negotiation neces-
sary.
Providing a minority veto in the confirmation process disrupts the allo-
cation of power granted by the founders in the constitutional design of the
appointment process. The Constitutional construction for appointments em-
bodies the idea that Congress would generally operate by majority rule.25°
As Fisk and Chemerinsky state, "The Constitution is specific about the
situations where more than a simple majority is required for Congress, or a
house of Congress, to act., 251 For example, there are only seven enumerated
circumstances in which the Constitution imposes a two-thirds require-
ment.
252
The Constitution calls for a supermajority requirement primarily, if not
exclusively, in circumstances in which there is a presumption of disapproval
of the act proposed.253 A presidential nomination for judicial appointment
carries with it a presumption of approval.254 The imposition of a superma-
jority requirement for confirmation of appointments abrogates the presump-
tion of presidential approval and upsets the allocation of power in the con-
stitutional design of the process.
The constitutional implication of majority consent in the advice and
consent function of the Senate supports curtailing the use of the filibuster in
judicial appointments. One solution to objectionable use of the filibuster is
the weakening of the filibuster in the federal appointment process by a pro-
gressive lowering of the cloture vote required to break a filibuster. 5 Pro-
fessor Brannon Denning has proposed a sliding scale that starts at sixty
of Citizensfor Independent Courts, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 1031, 1044 (1999).
247. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 232, at 184.
248. Id.
249. Webster's Dictionary defines facilitate as "to make easier." WEBSTER'S NEWWORLD
DICTIONARY 500-01 (2d ed. 1984).
250. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 232, at 239.
251. Id.
252. Id. Fisk & Chemerinsky list the seven instances as: removal after impeachment,
expulsion of a member from either Congressional house, overriding of a presidential veto,
treaty ratification, congressional proposal of a constitutional amendment, approval of the
election to Congress of a candidate who has engaged in insurrection or rebellion, and dis-
abling of a President under the twenty-fifth amendment. Id. at n.341. For a detailed discus-
sion of supermajority requirements see Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, Note, On Super-
majorities and the Constitution, 83 GEO. L. J. 2347, 2350 (1995).
253. GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 297.
254. Gerhardt, supra note 164, at 479.
255. Denning, supra note 73, at 32.
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votes, as presently required, and decreasing over a series of votes until the
fourth cloture vote, which would only require a majority. 6 A sliding scale
would allow filibuster to play a diminished, but not insignificant, role in the
appointment process while restoring the balance of power envisioned by the
founders and better comporting with the constitutional design for the proc-
ess.
Unfortunately, such reform seems unlikely because political leaders
"rarely agree to any formal alterations in the structure of the appointments
process unless they are convinced change is in their mutual institutional
interests. 257 Reforming the use of filibuster in the context of judicial ap-
pointments would require senators to act contrary to their own present bene-
fit and instead act for the future efficiency of the appointment process. 8
C. Senatorial Courtesy: Balancing the Interests of the President and
Home-State Senators
A second potential procedural reform is formalization of the well-
established practice of senatorial courtesy. Senatorial courtesy has survived
primarily because abandoning the practice provides little benefits to the
Senate but would come at the expense of a formidable negotiating tool.
259
Consequently, senators recognize the benefits of honoring their fellow sena-
tors' exercise of senatorial courtesy; "in fighting for a colleague's privilege
to take advantage of this practice, a senator protects his own entitlement to
it."'260 Considering the longstanding endurance of the practice and the sacri-
fice of power involved, for the Senate as a whole and Senators individually,
senatorial courtesy is not likely to be abandoned. Greater standardization in
the process, however, along with procedural changes to bring senatorial
courtesy more in line with constitutional design is both possible and desir-
able.
The previous sections discussed the policies behind senatorial cour-
tesy, 26' but the implications of these policies weigh differently depending on
the hierarchical level of the appointment. When examined in light of the
political and policy implications, senatorial courtesy becomes much less
objectionable in the context of district court appointments. These same con-
siderations, however, make adherence to senatorial courtesy less desirable
256. Id. Denning proposed a sliding scale decreasing in increments of three: sixty, fifty-
seven, fifty-four, and finally fifty-one. Id.
257. Gerhardt, supra note 156, at 1698.
258. See id.
259. See Gerhardt, supra note 164, at 530.
260. Id.
261. See supra Part II.
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for circuit court nominations262 and much more egregious for potential Su-
preme Court appointments. This section begins by supporting senatorial
courtesy in district courts and concludes by discussing the need to curtail
the use of senatorial courtesy in appellate court appointments.
1. Senatorial Courtesy in District Court Appointments
For district court appointments, senatorial courtesy plays a substantial
role in the process. 263 Senatorial courtesy is a procedural norm that should
be encouraged by presidents because it increases efficiency and public in-
volvement without substantially undermining of the constitutional design of
the process. On the district court level, senators from the state housing the
district court vacancy are likely to be more familiar than the President with
potential nominees. 2 4
Additionally, direct election by the state population allows home-state
senators to claim a more direct mandate from the electoral body over which
the judge will preside. The President potentially has less interest in spending
the political capital needed to overcome an objecting home-state Senator
regarding an individual district court nomination. As a result of the imbal-
ance of interest in the appointment, senatorial courtesy allows the President
to defer the nomination power to the home-state senators without substantial
political sacrifice.
2. Senatorial Courtesy in Appellate Court Appointments
The balance between presidential nomination autonomy and senatorial
courtesy shifts noticeably at the circuit court level265 where the court pre-
sides over several states. This operates to diminish the Senator's claim of
electoral mandate and bolster the constitutional policy arguments that origi-
nally supported presidential nomination discretion.266 Circuit court nomina-
tions frequently generate more attention and conflict than district court
nominations because the stakes are higher for the Senate and the President,
262. See John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the Senate's Advice and Consent Role,
36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 633, 661-62 (2003).
263. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 158. President Dwight Eisenhower's Deputy
Attorney General Lawrence Walsh summed up the importance of district court appointments
by noting that he found it virtually impossible to have a person confirmed for a federal
judgeship if one of the Senators from the candidate's home state is either "openly or secretly
opposed to the nomination." Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided
Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527, 582 n.12 (1998) (quoting Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal
Judiciary-Progress and the Road Ahead, 43 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 155, 156 (1960)).
264. See SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 31, at 159.
265. Id. at 158.
266. See supra Part II.
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largely because the circuit courts act as the court of last resort for the major-
ity of federal cases; those not granted certiorari by the United States Su-
preme Court.26 7
On the circuit court level, the balance of interests warrants some front-
end consideration of the opinions of senators whose constituents are cov-
ered by the circuit but fails to justify substantial deference. Instead, any
objections to circuit court nominees should cost the opposing Senator the
political capital expenditures consistent with other political positions the
Senator supports.
The nomination and confirmation of Clarence Thomas provide a useful
illustration of the difference between a circuit court nomination and a nomi-
nation to the Supreme Court. Thomas's nomination to the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit was approved with only two opposing votes, 268 while
his nomination to the Supreme Court resulted in more votes cast against him
than any other successful nominee in Supreme Court history.26 9 Senatorial
courtesy and sponsorship offer a plausible explanation for these seemingly
inconsistent votes. As a circuit court nominee, Thomas enjoyed sponsorship
by Missouri Senator John Danforth.270 Thomas had previously worked for
Danforth, and the Senator was one of his most outspoken supporters.27' The
practice of senatorial courtesy played a much less significant role in Tho-
mas's Supreme Court nomination. The decreased deference to sponsoring
senators, along with increased scrutiny of all nominees (and particularly
Supreme Court nominees) resulted in dramatically different votes when
Judge Thomas sought to become a justice. 272
Nominations to the United States Supreme Court naturally invoke
higher attention than any other federal judicial appointments. Senatorial
courtesy plays no significant role in modem Supreme Court appointments
because of the political magnitude of these appointments.273 Because all
senators have a clear interest in the appointment of Supreme Court justices
and all are individually accountable to their constituents, no single senator's
vote should be given greater weight through senatorial courtesy.
267. See Michael J. Mazza, A New Look at an Old Debate: Life Tenture and the Article
IIIJudge, 39 Gonz. L. Rev. 131, 133 (2003-2004).
268. Morning Edition: Federal Judge Shortage, supra note 8.
269. Senator Dennis DeConcini, Examining the Judicial Nomination Process: The Poli-
tics of Advice and Consent, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 1, 15 (1992). The Senate confirmed Thomas by
a vote of 52-48. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 51 (1998).
270. See Simon, supra note 29, at 77-81.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See Joseph S. Larisa, Popular Mythology: The Framers' Intent, the Constitution,
andIdeological Review ofSupreme Court Nominees, 30 B.C. L. REv. 969, 985 n.66 (1989).
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D. The Imposition of Time Structure on the Appointment Process
In October 2002, President Bush offered a four-part proposal establish-
ing a timeline for the judicial appointment process. 274 Bush's proposal calls
for all three branches of the federal government to adhere to set deadlines to
increase efficiency within the appointment process.275 Specifically, Bush's
plan calls for retiring appellate and district court judges, when possible, to
notify the President of their intention to retire at least one year in ad-
vance.276 The President would then have 180 days in which to submit a
nomination to the Senate for approval.27 7 After receiving the President's
nomination, the Senate Judiciary Committee would have ninety days to hold
a hearing.278 The full Senate would have 180 days from the date of receipt
of the nomination by the Senate Judiciary Committee to hold a vote for the
279nominee.
In a May 2003 radio address, Bush restated the timeline proposal and
proclaimed "[t]he goal is to have a new judge ready to take the bench on the
same day the sitting judge retires. 2 8 ° On the day of that radio address, Bush
also issued an executive order as a formal expression of his commitment to
adhere to the 180-day timeline.28 1 In an effort to promulgate Bush's pro-
posal, the Judicial Conference strongly urged compliance with the one-year
advance notice recommendation.2 82 Despite this limited support and a de-
mand for "the return of dignity and civility to the [appointment] process" by
a group of freshmen senators from both parties,283 the Senate has not en-
dorsed the President's plan. Additionally, the President has no means of
compelling Senate compliance with his timeline. This lack of authority is
rightfully so, as such compulsion would very likely be an invasion on the
Senate's power to establish its own rules.28 4
As a means of expediting the process, imposition of a timeline war-
rants more than a perfunctory glance. Although it would require congres-
274. Molly McDonough, Bush Proposes Changes to Judicial Confirmation, 1 No. 42
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2, Nov. 1, 2002.
275. Id.







282. President Calls for Judicial Reform (national radio broadcast, May 9, 2003),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/O5/20030509-4.html.
283. Id.
284. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 232, at 227-31 (arguing that the Senate is free
to establish its own procedural rules).
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sional self-restraint to enact either through alteration of Senate procedure or
through legislation, a variation of Bush's plan is not unattainable. Congress
has already statutorily enacted procedural rules enacting strict time limits on
debate and other procedural delay in the context of the budget process.285
The willingness of Congress to adopt time limits in the financial context is
an encouraging sign that Congress will take appropriate steps to promote
efficiency when necessary. With the role of the federal judiciary increasing
regularly 286 perhaps Congress will recognize the need to increase efficiency
in the appointment process and institute a timetable for the appointment of
federal judges.
Although one commentator has criticized Bush's proposal as an at-
tempt to "centralize power in the White House" and "diminish the Senate's
capacity to affect composition of the federal courts,, 287 the basic design of
the plan compliments the constitutional framing of the appointment process.
Any "diminishing" of the Senate's role in the process comes from eliminat-
ing filibuster as an acceptable means of advising; however, as discussed
above, silence is not especially useful advice.288
A few modifications to Bush's proposal might help alleviate some of
the criticism and facilitate Senate adoption. First, a primary alteration would
be the inclusion of the Senate in the determination of what timelines are
realistic for each phase of the process. Supreme Court nominations carry
greater national significance than district court nominations and the differ-
ence in scrutiny required could be incorporated into the time process by
making the amount of time for consideration vary with the judicial level of
the appointment.
Second, to help counter the diminished ability of a Senate minority to
prevent the confirmation of a nominee with questionable qualifications, the
ABA Committee should be restored to its previous, more prominent role of
consultation prior to formal nomination. The ABA provides a much-needed
examination of nominees' professional qualifications and judicial tempera-
ment sufficiently removed from the ideological beliefs of the nominee.289
The ABA's relatively objective evaluation helps ensure a high level of pro-
fessional proficiency and opens the door, through a lower ABA rating, for
legitimate senatorial concerns regarding inadequate professional qualifica-
290tions. Without this objective third party input, professional concerns are
more easily dismissed as ideological condemnation in disguise.
285. Id. at 215.
286. Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 4.
287. E. J. Dionne Jr., Bush's Judges, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2002, at A35.
288. See Eastman, supra note 262, at 657.
289. See Little, supra note 127, at 51-53 (2001).
290. See id. at 52.
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Another potential problem with Bush's proposal is the complete lack
of any effective enforcement mechanism for policing adherence to the time-
table because the President lacks authority to change procedural rules of the
Senate.29 One solution to the policing dilemma is public agreement by all
parties involved to adhere to such a timeline. Exposure to public scrutiny
would serve to police all parties through political accountability at the polls
for their assurances. In addition to potentially influencing voting, this public
accountability would provide grounds for legitimately objective criticism if
timetables were ignored.
IV. CONCLUSION
The first step in reforming the appointment process is recognizing that
much of the political confrontation surrounding the process is the natural
result of the constitutional design. Although the founders anticipated con-
flicts over nominations, the adversarial roles assigned to the major players
were designed to facilitate efficient resolutions. Within the structure pro-
vided by the framers, presidents and senators should be encouraged to vig-
orously debate and scrutinize the qualifications and ideology of each candi-
date. Problems have developed when this scrutiny has taken the form of
delay tactics that predominately serve the interests of individual political
leaders rather than facilitating a more efficient and productive appointment
process.
The process does not need rebuilding so much as it needs disinfecting;
a cleansing of the unhelpful and undesirable practices that have altered the
balance of power by placing too much control over appellate court-
especially Supreme Court-appointments in the hands of individual sena-
tors. Curtailing the use of filibuster as a negotiation tool by a decreasing
cloture structure would allow senators in a minority party an opportunity to
publicly express concern over a nominee without imposing a supermajority
requirement for confirmation. Similarly, the formalization of senatorial
courtesy in district court appointments ensures that senators are heard in the
appointment of district judges in their states. In circuit courts, where the
judges are frequently final arbiters of justice for a wider population and
political leaders have a more prominent interest in promoting their ideologi-
cal goals, home-state senators should play a significant but not overwhelm-
ing role in the appointment process. Supreme Court appointments are of
such national importance that no single senator's voice should be allowed,
through any form of senatorial courtesy, to drown out those of her fellow
senators.
291. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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A time requirement for nomination, confirmation, and appointment
would further increase efficiency and discourage some of the recent detri-
mental practices that stymie the process. Time limitations, however, should
be accompany procedures, such as more official inclusion ABA evaluations,
which ensure that time requirements do not diminish scrutiny of nominees'
qualifications. By implementing these proposed procedural reforms, federal
political leaders can increase efficiency in the judicial appointment process
while retaining the apportionment of power in the original constitutional
design.
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